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CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
The Death Penalty Cases:
Fumanv. Georgia, Jackson v. Georgia,
Branch v. Texas, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)
In Furman v. Georgia," the Supreme Court held
in a per curiam decision that in the cases before it,
the imposition and carrying out of the death pen-
alty constituted cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments.
In so ruling, the Court departed from its earlier
decisions that had tacitly approved the death pen-
alty as constitutional 2 and extended its previous
decisions defining cruel and unusual punishments.3
The fate of three defendants, William Henry
Furman, Lucious Jackson Jr., and Elmer Branch,
was decided by the Court in Furman. Each of the
defendants had been convicted of an aggravated
felony, Furman for murder,4 Jackson and Branch
for rape.5 Each had been sentenced to death. The
convictions of Furman and Jackson were affirmed
by the Georgia supreme court.6 The court of crim-
inal appeals of Texas affirmed Branch's conviction.Y
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in all three
cases8
Prior to its decision in Furman, the Court had
considered questions regarding the cruel and un-
usual punishment clause of the eighth amendment'
without ruling definitively on the constitutionality
of the death penalty.
In its first interpretations of the phrase "cruel
and unusual punishments" as applied to the death
penalty, the Court was more concerned with the
method of inflicting punishment rather than the
type of punishment itself or the punishment's ex,
1408 U.S. 238 (1972).
2See, e.g., In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 546 (1890); Wilk-
erson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878).
' See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660
(1972); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); Weems v.
United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
4 Furman during an armed robbery attempt shot and
killed the father of the household.
'Jackson raped a woman while holding a pair of
scissors to her throat. Branch raped a woman during
the course of a robbery at the victim's home.
6 Furman v. Georgia, 225 Ga. 253, 167 S.E.2d 628
(1969); Jackson v. Georgia, 225 Ga. 790, 171 S.E.2d
501 (1969).
7 Branch v. State, 447 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. Crim. App.
1969).
8 403 U.S. 952 (1971).
9 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII: "Excessive bail shallnot
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted."
cessive nature when compared to the crime. In
Wilkerson v. Utah," the Court unanimously upheld
a sentence of public execution by shooting. The
Court admitted the difficulty in trying to define the
exact meaning of "cruel and unusual" but indi-
cated that punishments of torture including being
disembowelled alive, beheaded and quartered and
those of similar "unnecessary cruelty" were cer-
tainly prohibited." In In re Kemmler," the Court
ruled that electrocution was not a cruel and un-
usual punishment since cruel and unusual implies
"more than the mere extinguishment of life."'
In Weems v. United Stakes,14 the Supreme Court
expanded the definition of a cruel and unusual
punishment. The Court in Weems invalidated for
the first time a legislatively established penalty as
"cruel and unusual", holding that as a "precept of
justice punishment for crime should be graduated
and proportioned to the offense." 1 The Court
thereby recognized that not only could the method
of punishment be inherently cruel, as are acts of
torture, but the punishment may be excessive when
compared to the offense and hence cruel and un-
usual. In Weems, fifteen years at hard labor in
ankle chains was held to be excessive for the crime
of falsifying govrnment records.' 6 The Weems
decision was, however, largely overlooked by suc-
ceeding Courts mainly because the eighth amend-
ment was not considered applicable to the states
at that time.7
Almost fifty years after Weems, the Supreme
Court reconsidered the scope of the eighth amend-
ment in Trop v. Dulles." The Court held that depri-
vation of a man's political existence affronted the
10 99 U.S. 130 (1878).
" Id. at 135-36.
"136 U.S. 436 (1890).
1" Id. at 447.
"4 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
1"Id. at 367.
16 rd. at 381.
17 See, e.g., Collins v. Johnston, 237 U.S. 502 (1915);
In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
"356 U.S. 86 (1958). The Court in Trop ruled that
denationalization of a convicted wartime deserter, who
had already served three years at hard labor, forfeited
all pay, and received a dishonorable discharge amounted
to a cruel and unusual punishment.
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dignity of man, the basic concept behind the eighth
amendment. The meaning of the phrase "cruel and
unusual" is not static, referring only to punish-
ments considered abhorrent in 1789. Rather the
amendment derives current meaning from the
"evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society." "1
With its decision in Robinson v. California?0
the Supreme Court revitalized the principles it
expounded in Weems. The Court ruled that in-
carceration for ninety days for being addicted to
the use of narcotics was excessive and thus a viola-
tion of the eighth amendment. As in Weems, the
Court was concerned with the excessive nature of a
punishment in relation to the offense. It noted that
the cruel and unusual punishments clause must be
continually reviewed in the light of contemporary
human knowledge to determine its current mean-
ing. Robinson also removed any lingering doubts
that the eighth amendment is applicable to the
states through the fourteenth amendment.2
Although the Supreme Court decided that the
death penalty was cruel and unusual in the three
cases at hand, the Furman decision did not fully
resolve the issue." The decision consists of nine
separate opinions with no true majority position.
Five Justices, Marshall, Brennan, Douglas, Stew-
art, and White concurred that in these cases, the
death penalty violated the eighth amendment. Of
these, only Justices Marshall and Brennan con-
sidered the death penalty to be totally impermissi-
ble under all circumstances. justices Burger,
Powell, Rehnquist, and Blackmun dissented in
separate opinions.
19 Id. at 101.
20 370 U.S. 660.
"See 408 U.S. at 328 n.34. Previously in Louisiana ex
rd. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947), the Court
stated that the eighth amendment prohibited the in-
fliction of unnecessary pain and that eighth amendment
principles apply to the states under the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause.
22 The Supreme Court recently has had several
opportunities to consider the death penalty question
but has either denied certiorari, e.g., Snider v. Cun-
ningham, 292 F.2d 683 (4th Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 889 (1963)- Rudolph v. State, 275 Ala. 115,
152 So. 2d 662 (1963J, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 899 (1963);
Swain v. State, 275 Ala. 508, 156 So. 2d 368 (1963),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 944 (1965); Craig v. State, 179
So. 2d 202 (Fla. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 959 (1966);
State v. Alvarez, 182 Neb. 358, 154 N.W.2d 746 (1967),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 823 (1968); Williams v. State,
427 S.W.2d 868 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967), cert. denied,
391 U.S. 926 (1968); or has decided the case on other
grounds, as in, Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262 (1970),
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), or Wither-
spoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1969).
For the "majority", Mr Justice Marshall as-
serted that the most important principle in analyz-
ing the cruel and unusual clause is that its language
"must draw its meaning from the evolving stand-
ards of decency that mark the progress of a matur-
ing society." 2 Therefore, a penalty which was ac-
ceptable at one time in our history may be cruel
and unusual now. The permissibility of a particular
punishment today is open to question regardless of
previous decisions. This rationale allowed Mr.
Justice Marshall to ignore those previous decisions
-Wilkerson 4 and Resweber2" and Kemmer2 -
which had tacitly approved of the death penalty.
After reviewing the reasons why a legislature
might select death as a punishment including retri-
bution, deterrence, prevention of repetitive crim-
inal acts, encouragement of guilty pleas and confes-
sions, eugenics and economy,2 Marshall argues
that all of these legislative purposes could be ac-
complished through less severe penalties. Marshall
contends that punishment for the sake of retribu-
tion is not permitted by the eighth amendment.8
Moreover, capital punishment is not necessary as a
deterrent to crime in this society; 2" in fact, mur-
derers are extremely unlikely to be recidivists and
often become model citizens."0 Marshall also rea-
sons that the elimination of the death penalty
would not impair the states' bargaining position in
obtaining confessions and guilty pleas since the
threat of imprisonment would be sufficient for this
purpose." Further, capital punishment can not be
defended on the ground that it improves society
since legislatures have never intended eugenic
goals" in formulating death sentences. Finilly, the
death penalty can not be defended as economical
since execution is actually more costly than life
"408 U.S. at 329 (Justice Marshall citing Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S; 86, 100-01 (1958)).
2499 U.S. 130 (1878).
25 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
26136 U.S. 436 (1890).
2408 U.S. at 342.
"3 Id. at 343 (Mr. justice Marshall relying on Weems
v. United States, 217 U.S. at 381).
21 Id. at 345-54 (Mr. Justice Marshall citingT. SEiLIN,
THE DEATH PENALTY, A REPORT OE THE MODEL
PENAL CODE PROJEcT Or THE AMERICAN LAW INsTI-
TuTE 5, 21, 35-39, 56-58 (1959); UNITED NATIONS,
DEPARTMENT OF EcONOMIC AND SocIAL APAIRs,
CAPITAL PUNIsHMNT 101-102, 116-118, 123 (1968);
Bedau, Deterrence and the Death Penalty: A Reconsidera-
lion, 61 J. CRIu. L.C. & P.S. 539, 542 (1970); Royal
Commission on Capital Punishment, 1949-1953, Cmd.
8932, 17-20).
"0 408 U.S. at 355.
3" Id. at 356.
1Id. at 356 & n.130.
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imprisonment." Since any possible legitimate pur-
pose of capital punishment could be served equally
well by imprisonment, Justice Marshall concluded
that the death penalty is an excessive punishment
and is, therefore, unconstitutional.1
4
Even if capital punishment were not an exces-
sively cruel and unusual penalty as judged by the
purposes it is supposed to serve, the death penalty
would still violate the eighth amendment, accord-
ing to justice Marshall, "because it is morally un-
acceptable to the people of the United States at this
time in our history." 35 Marshall narrowed the test
often used by courts that a punishment is valid
unless "it shocks the conscience and sense of justice
of the people," 36 to include only "informed citi-
zens". Justice Marshall argues that if the average
citizen were informed as to the liabilities of the
death penalty, he would conclude, as Marshall
does, that the death penalty is both cruel and un-
usual. Justice Marshall contends that even the
strongest proponent of the death penalty would
find it unacceptable if he were aware that the death
penalty is meted out discriminatorily, that inno-
cent persons have been executedI and that the
u Id. at 357 (Mr. Justice Marshall citing Caldwell,
Why is the Death Penalty Retained? 284 ANNALs 48
(1952); McGee, Capital Punishment as Seen by a Cor-
rectional Administrator, 28 FED. PROB. 11, 13-14 (June
1964); Bailey, Rehabilitation on Death Row, in THE
DEATH PENALTY IN AAERIcA, 556 (H. Bedau ed. 1967);
T. THomAs, Tins LIFE WE TAKE, 20 (3d ed. 1965)).
14 08 U.S. at 359.
3 Id. at 360. In addition to being excessive or morally
unacceptable, Justice Marshall contended that a pun-
ishment could also be cruel and unusual if it involved
so much physical pain and suffering that the public
would not tolerate it or if a penalty were previously
unknown to a particular offense. The latter two reasons,
Marshall believes, are not applicable to capital pun-
ishment. Id. at 330-31.
36 United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 608
(2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 838 (1952). See
also, Kasper v. Brittain, 245 F.2d 92, 96 (6th Cir.
1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 834 (1957) ("Shocking to
the sense of justice"); People v. Morris, 80 Mich. 634,
639, 45 N.W. 591-92 (1890) ("Shock the moral sense
of the people").
37 Since 1930 there have been 3,859 persons executed
in this country: 1751 white, 2066 black, 32 women.
NATIONAL PRISONER STATISTICS, CAPITAL PUNISH-
MENT 1930-1968 (No. 45, Aug. 1969). The last execu-
tion in the United States occurred on June 2, 1967,
NATIONAL PRISONER STATISTICS, CAPITAL PUNISH-
MENT 1930-1970 (No. 46, Aug. 1971).
"8 408 U.S. at 366 (Justice Marshall citing E. BOR-
CHAID, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (1932); J. FRANK &
B. FRANK, NOT GUILTY (1957); E. GARDNER, COURT
OF LAST RESORT (1952)). These three books examine
cases of innocent persons sentenced to death but not
executed. Bedau, Murder, Errors of Justice and Capital
Punishment, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AmERICA (H.
Bedau ed. 1967), contends that innocent persons have
been executed.
death penalty distorts our system of criminal jus-
tice, undesirably affecting the jury, the attorneys,
the judge and the public during the course of cer-
tain trials. 9
Mr. Justice Brennan argued that a punishment
that does not comport with human dignity is cruel
and unusual. 40 Brennan stated four interrelated
principles which enable the Court to determine
whether a punishment comports with human dig-
nity.
41
First and most important, a punishment must
not degrade the dignity of a human being. Mr.
Justice Brennan argued that the death penalty is
degrading just as the Court held in Trop v. DulleS4
that expatriation which strips an individual of his
political identity and his status in organized society
is degrading and hence cruel and unusual. Death
ends not only one's political existence but termi-
nates his very existence. Further, the process of
implementing the death penalty has been recog-
nized by some as being so degrading and bru-
talizing to the spirit of man as to constitute an
impermissible psychological torture.3
Brennan's second principle is that the punishment
must not be arbitrarily inflicted by the state. Since
the death penalty is used so rarely, Brennan con-
cluded that it must be inflicted arbitrarily4 Juries
have complete discretion to impose the death pen-
alty,4 5 thereby permitting the arbitrary and capri-
cious selection of victims for the death penalty.
Third, to comport with human dignity a punish-
ment must be acceptable to society. Justice Bren-
nan finds that because the scope of the death pen-
alty has been increasingly restricted and its use in-
creasingly less frequent, society disapproves of
capital punishment. 46 The current moratorium on
' 408 U.S. at 369 (Marshall citing Ehrmann, The
Death Penalty and the Administration of Justice, 284
ANN.ALs 73, 83 (1952); F. FRANKFURTER, OF LAW AND
MEN 81 (1956)).
40 Id. at 270 (Brennan citing Trop. v. Dulles, 356
U.S. at 100-01).
41 Id. at 271-79.
42 356 U.S. at 101.
4' 408 U.S. at288 (Mr. Justice Brennan citing People v.
Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 649, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal.
Rptr. 152, 166 (1972)).
4408 U.S. at 291. See NATIONAL PRISONER STATISTICS,
CAPITAL PUNIsmAENT 1930-1970 (No. 46 Aug. 1971).
45 McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 207 (1971),
concluded:
In light of history, experience, and the present
limitations of human knowledge, we find it quite
impossible to say that committing to the untram-
meled discretion of the jury the power to pro-
nounce life or death in capital cases is offensive to
anything in the Constitution.
4 8408 U.S. at 297. See note 44 supra.
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executions further indicates that society finds the
death penalty abhorrent.Y
Finally, like Marshall, Mr. Justice Brennan sees
no reason to believe that capital punishment ac-
complishes any penal function better than the less
severe forms of punishment. To inflict the death
penalty under these circumstances would be an ex-
cessive punishment because a less severe penalty
would serve the interests of society equally well.4
Thus, Justice Brennan finds that the death pen-
alty is inconsistent with each of his four principles
indicating that capital punishment does not com-
port with human dignity and therefore is uncon-
stitutional in all cases.
Of the remaining "majority Justices", neither
Justices Stewart, White, nor Douglas decided that
the death penalty is inherently unconstitutional.
Each Justice indicated that there may be condi-
tions under which the death penalty could be
permissible.
Mr. Justice Douglas argued that the death
penalty provides judges and juries with complete
discretion to say which defendant will live and
which will die.49 This discretion allows the death
penalty to be applied arbitrarily and discrimia-
torily against blacks, the poor, the young and
the ignorant. 0 The infrequency with which the
death penalty is imposed raises a strong inference
that it is being meted out arbitrarily in violation
of equal protection concepts implicit in the eighth
amendment. Any punishment administered in an
arbitrary or discriminatory manner is "unusually"
imposed, Douglas contends. 51 Discretionary stat-
utes, like death sentences, are "pregnant with dis-
crimination", imposing penalties which are cruel
and unusual.M Although he did not expressly
consider the validity of a mandatorily imposed
death penalty, Justice Douglas might find a care-
fully drawn statute which eliminates all discretion
and could not ,be discriminatorily applied, per-
missible under the eighth amendment. Douglas
did note, however, that a statute apparently non-
47 Id. at 291 n.40. See note 37 supra.
48Id. at 305.
" Id. at 249. See note 45 supra.50Id. at 250 (Mr. Justice Douglas citing: PREsI-
DENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENORCErENT AND An-
MIsNITRATiON O JusTiCE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME
IN A FREE SocIETY 143 (1967); Koeninger, Capital
Punishment in Texas, 1927-1968, 15 CR. & DEL. 132,
141 (1969); THE DEATH PENALTY IN A ERICA 474 (H.
BEDAU ed. 1967)).
1 Id. at 249. (Douglas citing: Goldberg &oDersho-
witz, ,Dedaring te Death Penally Unconstitulional, 83
HARv. L. REv. 1773, 1790 (1970)).2Id. at 257.
discriminatory on its face could still be applied
so as to violate the fourteenth amendment.
Although Mr. Justice Stewart found that there
are persuasive reasons for finding the death penalty
cruel and unusual-the penalty's uniqueness and
irrevocability, its total rejection of concepts of
rehabilitation and humanity-he did not decide
the inherent constitutionality of capital punish-
ment.5
Mr. Justice Stewart, relying on Weems v. United
States,5' found the death penalty as applied to the
petitioners "cruel" because it goes excessively
beyond the kind of punishment considered nec-
essary by the state legislatures, and "unusual"
in that the death penalty is only rarely imposed
for either rape or murder.56 The present random
and capricious selection of those sentenced to
death makes the death penalty cruel and unusual
just as being struck by lightning is random and
capricious and cruel and unusual.N Stewart con-
cluded that "the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments can not tolerate... [a penalty that is] so
wantonly and so freakishly imposed." m'
Unlike Marshall, Mr. Justice Stewart believes
that retribution is a constitutionally permissible
aspect of punishment. Retribution serves certain
justifiable needs and goals of society. 59 If uni-
formly imposed, the death penalty would provide
a measure of retribution. It is conceivable, there-
fore, that Justice Stewart might find certain crimes
so heinous that they deserve to be punished by
death in all cases.
Mr. Justice White considered the consitutional-
ity of capital punishment statutes when 1) the
legislature authorizes the imposition of the death
penalty for murder or rape; 2) the death penalty
is not mandatory for any particular class or kind
of case but it delegates the decision of when the
death penalty will be imposed to judges and juries;
and 3) judges and juries have ordered the death
penalty so infrequently that the odds are now
very much against imposition and execution with
13Id. at 257 (Justice Douglas citing Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)).
5Id. at 306.
55 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
56 408 U.S. at 309 (Mr. Justice Stewart citing the




19 Id. at 308. Mr. Justice Stewart argued that retri-
bution is part of man's natural instinct and that the
seeds of anarchy will be sown if that instinct is not
satisfied.
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respect to any convicted murderer or rapist.10
Like the other concurring Justices, White found
the infrequency with which the death penalty is
imposed significant. However, unlike his Brothers
who considered infrequency to be either an indica-
tion of society's disapproval of the death penalty
or an indication of arbitrary or discriminatory
use, Justice White argued that a penalty that is
used so rarely fails as a deterrent and has little
retributive value. He reasoned that a penalty with
such "negligible returns to the State would be
patently excessive and ... violative of the Eighth
Amendment." 6
Justice White neither stated nor implied that
the death penalty is unconstitutional per se or
that there could be no circumstances in which its
imposition would not comply with the eighth
amendment. White did imply that there could be
conditions under which the application of the death
penalty would be permissible. Justice White does
not consider the death penalty to be inherently
"cruel"; he finds that those who are executed
may well have received what they deserved.62
If the death penalty could be imposed so as to
produce greater deterrent and retributive value,
as in the case of a mandatory death penalty for
certain crimes, Mr. Justice White might well find
it permissible.
The dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Burger
contains an a-.-ly-i- of whether the eighth amend-
ment prohibits capital punishment and a plea
for judicial non-involvement on the issue of aboli-
tion of the death penalty. He begins with an ex-
amination of the scope of the prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishments. The Chief Justice
asserts:
Although the Eighth Amendment literally reads as
prohibiting only those punishments that are both
"cruel" and "unusual," history compels the con-
clusion that the Constitution prohibits all punish-
ments of extreme and barbarous cruelty, regard-
less of how frequently or infrequently imposed.6'
According to Chief Justice Burger's interpretation
the Founding Fathers were most concerned with
torturous or excessively cruel punishments." Early
61 Id. at 311.
11 Id. at 312.
2Id. at 313.
6Id. at 376.
"During the Massachusetts debates on ratification
of the Bill of Rights, Mr. Holmes referred to "the most
cruel and unheard-of punishments." 2 Ta DEBATES nT
THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION
Supreme Court decisions reflected this concern
and focused primarily on whether the punish-
ment was "cruel" rather than whether it was
"unusual." 65 When the eighth amendment was
adopted, capital punishment was not considered
cruel.6 6 Since then, Burger claims, judicial de-
cisions have cast no doubt upon the constitution-
ality of the death penalty."
Despite past indications of constitutionality,
the Chief Justice acknowledges that whether capital
punishment is cruel and unusual today must be
determined by reference to contemporary stand-
ards of permissibility. Past decisions have recog-
nized that interpretations of the eighth amend-
ment prohibition necessarily change as the mores
of society change." However, Chief Justice Burger
counsels judicial restraint when the Court is asked
to interpret societal mores. No judicially manage-
able technique has been developed for measuring
an evolution in society's moral consensus on capi-
tal punishment. Thus the courts must defer to
oF T= FEDERAL CoNsTIooN 111 (2d ed. J. Elliot
1836). During the Virginia debates, Patrick Henry
referred to "tortures, or cruel and barbarous punish-
ment". Id. at 447.
But se-e Justice Brennan's opinion, where he states
that it does not follow from these statements that the
Framers were concerned solely with cruel punishments.
408 U.S. at 260.
6 Attempting to define the meaning of the eighth
amendment prohibition, the Supreme Court has stated:
"[Ilt is safe to affirm that punishments of torture...
and all others in the same line of unnecessary cruelty,
are forbidden by that amendment to the Constitution."
Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1878).
Furthermore, Chief Justice Warren stated that
precedent has shown no regard for the effect the term
"unusual" may have on the meaning of the prohibition.
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 n.32 (1958).
66 The fifth amendment guarantees that death will
not be imposed without a grand jury indictment. The
double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment pro-
hibits being put in jeopardy twice for the same offense.
U.S. CONST. amend V. Since the fifth and eighth amend-
ments were adopted together, these explicit references
to capital punishment signify that the framers did not
consider it to violate thc eight amendment.
6Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); Louisiana ex
rd. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947); Wilker-
son v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878). But ;ee Justice Gold-
berg's dissent from a denial of certiorari in Snider v.
Cunningham, 375 U.S. 889, 890 (1963), where he sug-
gests that, judged by contemporary standards, the
death penalty for rape may be unconstitutional.
"The Supreme Court has stated that the eighth
amendment prohibition "may acquire meaning as
public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane
justice." Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378
(1910). In Trop v. Dulles, the plurality opinion stated:
"The Amendment must, draw its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress
of a maturing society." 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
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the legislatures when such a judgement is needed."
In a democracy, the legislative judgement is pre-
sumed to mirror prevailing standards of decency.
Therefore a legislatively approved penalty carries
a presumption of validity. 0 Only proof of over-
whelming public condemnation of capital punish-
ment will overcome this presumption.
The Chief Justice then asserts there are no ob-
vious indications of societal condemnation of capi-
tal punishment sufficient to overcome the presump-
tion of legislative validity7 Public opinion polls
show no universal rejection of capital punishment.
72
Further, Chief Justice Burger rejects the conten-
tion put forth by Justices Marshall and Brennan
that the infrequent imposition of the death penalty
reflects widespread disapproval by society. It is
argued that, in capital cases where juries impose
death, they are acting arbitrarily and without
sensitivity to prevailing standards of decency.
However, it is the duty of the jury to reflect con-
temporary standards," and there is no empirical
proof that juries have failed to discharge this
duty.74 The declining rate of imposition does not
establish that capital punishment is now considered
intolerably cruel.70
For Justice Stewart, the low rate of imposition
""[Bloth in constitutional contemplation and in
fact, it is the legislature, not the Court, which responds
to public dpinion and immediately reflects the society's
standards of decency." 408 U.S. at 383 (Burger, C. J.,
dissenting).
70 Id. at 384.
7 This presumption is great because 80% of the
states, as well as the federal government have capital
punishment statutes. Nor is there a trend toward aboli-
tion of the death penalty. In the last eleven years, four
new capital crimes have been approved by the federal
government. Capital punishment is now authorized
for the assassination of the President, Vice-President,
or nominee for those offices; for the assassination of a
Congressman; for explosives offenses resulting in
death; and for airplane hijacking.
72 A 1969 poll indicated that 51% favored capital
punishment, with 40% opposed. This reflects a growth
m aproval of the death penalty from 1966 when only
42; approved. Erskine, The Polls: Capital Punish-
ment, 34 Pun. OpNmoN Q. R.v. 290 (1970). In support
of the Chief Justice, Justice Powell cites a 1966 Colo-
rado referendum which indicated approximately 65%
approval of capital punishment. THE DEATH PENALTY
iN AMERICA 233 (H. Bedau ed. 1967). In 1970, 64% of
the llinois voters approved of capital punishment.
Bedau, The Death Penally in America, 35 FED. PROB.'
32, 35 (Feb. 1971).
73 [A] jury that must choose between life impris-
onment and capital punishment can do little
more--and must do nothing less-than express the
conscience of the community on the ultimate ques-
tion of life or death.
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968).
71408 U.S. at 389.
7 Id. at 390.
is not indicative of societal disapproval of capital
punishment, but reflects an abuse by juries of
their discretion in sentencing. Punishments are
cruel when they exceed that which the legislatures
have deemed necessary for all cases; punishments
are unusual when they exceed that which is im-
posed in most cases. Chief Justice Burger views
this as a procedural due process attack against
discretionary sentencing cast in the language of
the eighth amendment. He repeats his claim that
no empirical data reveals inbitrary sentencing
practices7  Furthermore, only last year in
McGautha v. California, ' the Supreme Court up-
held discretionary sentencing practices in capital
cases. Under the opinions of justices Stewart and
White, legislatures must establish strict standards
for juries to follow in determining sentences in
capital cases. This disregards the belief that such
standards are impossible to fashion m The Chief
Justice asserts that the eighth amendment does
not demand the elimination of jury discretion in
sentencing.
Chief Justice Burger rejects the view, adopted
by Justices Marshall and Brennan, that capital
punishment is cruel since it is not necessary to
achieve legitimate penal ends. Considerations of
the efficacy of a punishment are not within the
scope of an eighth amendment inquiry. The Chief
Justice asserts: "Apart from these isolated uses of
the word 'unnecessary,' nothing in these cases
suggests that it is for the courts to make a deter-
mination of the efficacy of punishments." 79 He
concludes that the eighth amendment is not ad-
dressed to social utility, nor does it require ad-
herence to principles of penology.
Justice Blackmun repeats the advice of Chief
justice Burger: the decision whether capital pun-
ishment is considered cruel and unusual by con-
temporary society is a legislative decision80 Argu-
76 Id. at 399.
77 402 U.S. 183 (1971). See note 45 supra.
78 "[H]istory reveals continual efforts, uniformly
unsuccessful, to identify before the fact those homi-
cides for which the slayer should die." 402 U.S. at 197.
79 408 U.S. at 393.
In Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1878), the
Supreme Court stated: "[Ilt is safe to affirm that
punishments of torture and all others in the same line
of unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden by the Constitu-
tion." In Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329
U.S. 459, 463 (1947), the Supreme Court referred to
the eighth amendment prohibition against the infliction
of unnecessary pain. Chief Justice Burger interprets
both statements as referring to the cruelty involved,
not a questioning of the efficacy of the punishment.
Ojustice Blackmun states in his dissent, 408 U.S. at
406:
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ments claiming that the total abolition of capital
punishment is the decent and moral thing to do
make sense, but only when argued in the legisla-
tive arena. Justice Blackmun urges judicial re-
straint because of the potential effect of this de-
cision on state legislature- and Congress. He fears
that many legislatures will enact mandatory death
penalty statutes, an approach he considers a re-
gressive step in criminal justice.8
Finally, Justice Blackmun agrees with the Chief
Justice that prevailing societal standards do not
indicate condemnation of capital punishment. The
Supreme Court has consistently upheld the per-
missibility of capital punishment.82 He points to
overwhelming Congressional majorities in favor
of recent capital punishment statutes.P The legis-
lators, whose function it is to represent prevailing
societal opinion, dearly believe capital punishment
to be permissible. In the face of this evidence,
Justice Blackmun concludes that the Supreme
Court must not impose its personal beliefs upon
society.
For Justice Powell the principles of stare decisis,
judicial restraint, and federalism should control
the decision of the Court in these cases. Contrary
to the opinion of Justice Marshall, he asserts that
previous cases have decided the constitutionality
of capital punishment. The decisions in Wilkerson
v. UtatV and it re Keininler,95 which involved
the constitutionality of methods of execution,
were of logical necessity based upon. the constitu-
tionality of capital purishment9 6 Other decisions
Were I a legislator, I would vote against the death
penalty for the policy reasons adopted in the sev-
eral opinions filed by the Justices who vote to re-
verse these convictions.8lJustice Blackmun interprets Justices Stewart and
White to mean if capital punishment were mandatorily
imposed it would be constitutional. Blackmun wants
the discretion to remain with the jury, so they may
exercise mercy where warranted. Id. at 413. Chief Justice
Burger also feared the enactment of mandatory death
statutes, claiming the jury would vote to acquit where
they felt death was not appropriate.
12 E.g. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971);
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99 (1958).
81 The aircraft piracy statute passed the Senate
92-0, 1961.107 CONG. REc. 15440 (1961). The Omnibus
Crime Act, which included the Congressional assassina-
tion statute passed the House 341-26. 116 CoNG. REc.
35363-35364 (1971). The Act passed the Senate 59-0.
116 CoNG. REc. 35743 (1971).
99 U.S. 130 (1878).
15 !So U.S. 436 (1890).8 1 In Wilkerson v. Utah, the Court ruled that public
shooting was a legitimate method of execution. 99 U.S.
130 (1878). In In re Kemmler, electrocution was held
to be a permissible method of execution. 136 U.S. 436
(1890). Both cases specifically establish the constitu-
have stipulated or assumed its constitutionalityP
The principle of stare decisis requires a high degree
of proof that capital punishment does indeed
violate the eighth amendment.
However, Justices Douglas and Marshall seek
to avoid the weight of precedent by invoking the
"evolving standards of decency" doctrine enun-
ciated in Trop v. Dulles.P Mr Justice Powell, like
the Chief Justice and Justice Blackmun, admits
this approach is valid in determining what is cruel
and unusual within the meaning of the eighth
amendment, but he advises judicial restraint. The
Court must not force personal opinions about
capital punishment upon society under the guise
of contemporary community standards8 9 Notions
of federalism also counsel judicial restraint. Justice
Powell argues that "designation of punishments
for crimes is a matter peculiarly within the sphere
of the state and federal legislative bodies." 9o Where
the statutes of forty states and the federal govern-
ment are involved, the necessity for judicial re-
straint is great indeed."
The principles of stare decisis, judicial restraint,
and federalism thrust a heavy burden of proof
upon the majority's attempt 'to prove that con-
temporary society considers capital punishment
to be cruel and unusual. Justice Powell ruled that
the proofs offered by justices Marshall and Bren-
nan do not meet this heavy burden. Powell con-
cludes:
tionality of the death penalty. Inquiry into method
would have been a mere academic exercise if the Court
had believed death itself was unconstitutional.
81 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958):
At the outset, let us put to one side the death pen-
alty as an index of the constitutional limit on pun-
ishment. Whatever the arguments may be against
capital punishment, both on moral grounds and in
terms oi ccomplishing the purposes of punish-
ment-and they are forceful-the death penalty
has been employed throughout our history, and,
in a day when it is still widely accepted, it cannot
be said to violate the constitutional concept of
cruelty.
Id. at 99.
88 Id. at 100-01.
89 It is not easy to stand aloof and allow want of
wisdom to prevail, to disregard one's own strongly
held view of what is wise in the conduct of affairs.
But it is not the business of this Court to pronounce
policy. It must observe a fastidious regard for
limitations on its own power, and this precludes
the Court's giving effect to its own notions of what
is wise or politic. That self-restraint is of the es-
sence in the observance of the judicial oath, for
the Constitution has not authorized the judges to
sit in judgment of the wisdom of what Congress
and the Executive Branch do.
Id. at 120 (dissenting opinion).
90 408 U.S. at 431.
"1 Id. at 432.
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[T]he indicators most likely to reflect the public's
view-legislative bodies, state referenda, and the
juries which have the actual responsibility---do not
support the contention that evolving standards of
decency require total abolition of capital punish-
ment.n
Petitioners sought to salvage the claim that con-
temporary society condemns capital punishment
by arguing that the infrequent imposition of the
death penalty has effectively diffused public op-
position. If capital punishment were imposed in a
greater number of cases, and if society became
aware of the moral issues involved, the public
would repudiate the death penalty. Justice Powell
- again advocates judicial restraint in considering
this argument, since conjecture about possible
public response to capital punishment involves
no judicially manageable standards. A similar
argument, presented by Justice Marshall, claims
that if the public knew of the discriminatory im-
position of capital punishment they would con-
demn the death penalty. This position is rejected
by Justice Powell as too speculative.93
Justice Powell agrees with Chief Justice Burger
that questions of the efficacy of capital punishment
in achieving criminal ends are not within the scope
of the eighth amendment. If such questions were
within the.scope of judicial inquiry, a presumption
of validity would attach to legislatively approved
penalties. 4 Proofs such as those advanced by
Justices Brennan and Marshall, that the death
penalty fulfills no penal function better than other
2 Id. at 442.
Forty states presently have capital punishment
statutes. This number has remained relatively stable
since World War L While legislative committees in
Pennsylvania and Maryland recommended abolition
of capital punishment, committees in New Jersey and
Florida have recommended retention. 2 NATIONAL
CoMMwssioN ON REORM OF FEDERAL CRIMNAL LAW,
WoRXMbnG PAPERS, 1365 (1970). Federal legislation
also shows no repudiation of capital punishment. See
note 83 supra.
State referenda also do not reflect overwhelming
condemnation of the death penalty. An Oregon refer-
endum seeking the abolition of the death penalty was
approved in 1964. THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA
233 (H. Bedau ed. 1967). However, the death penalty
was approved by 65% of Colorado voters in 1966. Id.
In 1970, approximately 64% of the voters in Illinois
approved capital punishment. H. Bedau, The Death
Penalty in America, 35 FED. PROB. 35 (Feb. 1971).
93 408 U.S. at 446.
14 Since the authorization of criminal sanctions is an
area within the special competency of the legislature,
the courts have created a presumption of validity.
Louisiana ex tel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459,
470 (1947) (concurring opinion); Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349, 378-9 (1910); In re Kemmler,
136 U.S. 438, 449 (1890).
penalties, would not be sufficient to overcome the
presumption of legislative validity.
95
Of the four dissenting Justices, only Justice
Powell discusses the claim that capital punishment
is disproportionate to the crime of rape. 6 Past
decisions have ruled that the eighth amendment
prohibits punishments greatly disproportionate to
the crime charged.9 However, Justice Powell
asserts that the Court may prohibit such punish-
ments only where it is "grossly" excessive or
"greatly" disproportionate."3 It is impossible, he
argues, to rule that the death penalty is grossly
excessive for all crimes of rape.9 9 justice Powell
does indicate approval of an analysis of individual
sentences of death under the eighth amendment 0
Justice Rehnquist does not deal with the ques-
tion of whether capital punishment is cruel and
unusual within the meaning of the eighth amend-
ment. Instead he argues that the Court should
not have decided this question. While the exercise
of executive and legislative power is subject to
judicial review, this grant of power surely was not
meant to leave the judiciary unchecked. Rather
this power was granted with the implied, if not
express, condition of judicial self-restraint. Justice
Rehnquist believes that the Court has exceeded
its power, completely disregarding the principle
of judicial restraint:
The task of judging constitutional cases imposed
by Art. III cannot for this reason be avoided, but
it must surely be approached with the deepest
humility and genuine deference to legislative judge-
ment. Today's decision to invalidate capital punish-
ment is significantly lacking in those attributes.
For the reasons well stated in the opinions of the
Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Powell, and Mr. Justice
Blackmun, I conclude that this decision holding
unconstitutional capital punishment is not an act of
iudgement, but rather an act of will.10'
In sum, in Furman v. Georgia five Supreme Court
Justices for separate reasons agreed that the death
penalty was cruel and unusual for the three de-
g' 408 U.S. at 456.
"6 Chief Justice Burger stated that he agreed with
Justice Powell's conclusion. Justice Blackmun simply
stated that he believed that capital punishment was
not disproportionate for the crime of rape. Id. at. 414
97 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910);
O'Neill v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1892) (dis-
senting opinion).
Is 408 U.S. at 457.
11 Id. at 458.
100 Specific rape and homicide cases can be imagined
in which the conduct of the accused may not warrant
the imposition of death. Id. at 461.
101 Id. at 468.
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